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In the last decades, the rapid growth of functional brain imaging methodologies allowed
cognitive neuroscience to address open questions in philosophy and social sciences.
At the same time, novel insights from cognitive neuroscience research have begun
to influence various disciplines, leading to a turn to cognition and emotion in the fields
of planning and architectural design. Since 2003, the Academy of Neuroscience
for Architecture has been supporting ‘neuro-architecture’ as a way to connect
neuroscience and the study of behavioral responses to the built environment. Among
the many topics related to multisensory perceptual integration and embodiment,
the concept of hapticity was recently introduced, suggesting a pivotal role of tactile
perception and haptic imagery in architectural appraisal. Arguments have thus
risen in favor of the existence of shared cognitive foundations between hapticity
and the supramodal functional architecture of the human brain. Precisely, supramodality
refers to the functional feature of defined brain regions to process and represent specific
information content in a more abstract way, independently of the sensory modality
conveying such information to the brain. Here, we highlight some commonalities
and differences between the concepts of hapticity and supramodality according to the
distinctive perspectives of architecture and cognitive neuroscience. This comparison
and connection between these two different approaches may lead to novel observations
in regard to people–environment relationships, and even provide empirical foundations
for a renewed evidence-based design theory.
Keywords: neuroscience, architecture and design, sensory perception, vision, touch, hapticity, supramodality,
review
In recent years, novel methodologies to explore the neurobiological bases of mind and behavior
have inspired the fields of architecture (e.g., Mallgrave, 2011), planning and urban studies
(Portugali, 2004, 2011; van der Veen, 2012; de Lange, 2013), geography (Anderson and Smith,
2001), social sciences and the humanities (Leys, 2002) to open toward cognitive neuroscience and,
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more specifically, to brain imaging. Novel interdisciplinary
fields with the ‘neuro-’ prefix have thus recently emerged,
such as neuro-economy, neuro-law, neuro-marketing, and even
neuro-architecture. A neuroscientific approach to the most
diverse fields has proven to be able to offer experimental-
based pieces of evidence to different domains, often confirming,
reviewing or integrating previous theoretical notions. Yet, when
promoting any dialog among disciplines, caution must be urged
against certain conceptual ambiguities, as we shall see in this
commentary.
NEUROSCIENCE AND ARCHITECTURE
In architecture, new awareness of the complexity of cognitive and
emotional processes involved in the daily experience of designed
environments has rapidly grown. Such interest also led to the
foundation of the Academy of Neuroscience for Architecture
(ANFA) in 2003 in San Diego. Since then, various important
contributions have emerged from both fields (Eberhard, 2008;
Mallgrave, 2011; Robinson and Pallasmaa, 2015).
Provocatively, we may argue that neurophysiology and
design started influencing one another during the Renaissance,
when anatomists and designers shared their education, studies
and the same cultural milieu: while Vesalius, Descartes and
Willis explored the functional and structural characteristics
of the central nervous system, laying the grounds for the
subsequent scientific revolution, artists such as Leonardo Da
Vinci and Andrea Mantegna spent their days in anatomical
observations, visionary hydraulic projects, painting and
architectural design.
Since then, design studies and life sciences have been
continuously inspiring each other, but only recently have
they started to truly share interdisciplinary theoretical and
methodological perspectives. Nowadays, the contribution of
neuroscientists is actively influencing the architectural debate.
For instance, Albright (2015) is approaching design with
a neuroscientific perspective on perception and aesthetics.
Suggestions on the role of embodied cognition through the
mirror neuron system in aesthetic response (Freedberg and
Gallese, 2007) are taken into account in architectural essays
(Mallgrave, 2012; Pallasmaa, 2012; Robinson and Pallasmaa,
2015), and Zeki’s neuroaesthetic theories are being discussed
within the architectural field (Mallgrave, 2011). Arbib (2012,
2015) is directly addressing designers with suggestions on
sensory perception that could have an impact on design
practice.
A specific topic now emerging in the neuro-architectural
debate deals with the relationship between sensory experience
and architectural perception. The role of non-visual perceptual
modalities, and specifically of touch, is currently arousing
great interest (e.g., Pallasmaa, 2005). Here, we specifically
focus on how the recent neuroscientific evidence of a
modality-independent processing of sensory information
could actually lead to a ‘sensory intensification’ (i.e., visual and





In the past, many architectural theorists already speculated about
the body-architecture relationship, usually in formal theories
lacking any experiential or perceptual bases, as in the famous
cases of the ‘golden-ratio’ (Markowsky, 1992; Höge, 1995; Falbo,
2005) or other ‘natural’ formal principles, such as those inspired
by the supposed preference for natural, living forms (the so-called
‘biophilia hypothesis’ – for a critical assessment see Joye and De
Block, 2011).
The phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
(1964) initiated a theory postulating the embodiment of the
built environment into our daily sensorial experience. Similarly,
the Danish architect Steen Eiler Rasmussen (1964) favored
the importance of perceiving and appreciating architectural
features through different sensory modalities, such as in
the subtle haptic cues mediated by visual perception: for
instance, visual cues on textures and shapes are also able
to convey haptic information, as roughness, smoothness or
weight, and thus to gratify the eye through sensorimotor
imagery (Figure 1A). Other authors supported an even
tighter relationship between architectural design and embodied
cognition, as well as architectural experience and bodily self-
consciousness (Mallgrave, 2011; Pasqualini et al., 2013). For
instance, the architect Yudell claimed that the visual rhythm
of the urban landscape could actually affect body motion
(e.g., our walking pace) and excite our imagination toward
an enhanced interaction with environmental elements, as in
fantasizing about climbing non-existent steps when looking at
the unusually textured facade of a skyscraper (in: Bloomer and
Moore, 1977).
Currently, multisensory perceptual integration and the role
of the sense of touch in architectural design are being explored
through the notion of hapticity. The term hapticity is commonly
defined as “the sensory integration of bodily percepts” (Pallasmaa,
2005, 2000) and it suggests a pivotal role of tactile-based
(i.e., generally non-visually based) perception and imagery
in the architectural experience. The Finnish architect and
theorist Pallasmaa hypothesizes the existence of an “unconscious
tactile ingredient in vision” (Pallasmaa, 2005) that would be
fundamental in architectural appreciation and would exalt touch
as the primordial sensory modality.
In this view, even though touch and vision remain intrinsically
interwoven in object form and spatial perception, tactile
sensations would constitute the core of architectural appraisal
(Figure 1B). In this sense, for example, it is common to refer
to a comfortable and relaxing space as a ‘warm’ place. In
this regard, Pallasmaa just recently stressed the importance
of sensory experience and our ability to catch complex
atmospheres and moods “through simultaneous multi-sensory
sensing” (Pallasmaa, 2012). The anthropologist Hall (1966)
also emphasized the lack of appeal among designers for the
role of haptic sensations, even when visually presented, in
bonding people with their environment. Similarly, the architect
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FIGURE 1 | (A) According to the notion of hapticity, visual cues (e.g., textures or shapes) are able to convey tactile information (e.g., roughness or consistency). Left,
top and bottom: edgy shape and texture. Right, top and bottom: smooth shape and texture. Of note, neuroscientific observations showed that the same perceptual
information is often processed in a supramodal manner, i.e., independently of the modality through which that sensory content is acquired. (B) What are the
implications of supramodal processing when perceiving architecture, such as the facades of the Beauvais Cathedral (Beauvais, France – on the left) or of the Casa
Milà (Barcelona, Spain – on the right)? Has visual appreciation of architecture any non-visual (e.g., tactile) implications as well?
Sara Robinson (2015) recently reconsidered the privileged link
between haptic sensations and emotion.
Consistently, theorists in the architectural field recently
advised against the overemphasis on vision as the primary source
of aesthetic appreciation, which may result in biased design
methodology (O’Neill, 2001; Mallgrave, 2011). Similarly, the
neuro-architectural framework claims that the lack of expertise
on multi-sensorial appreciation represents a serious limitation
in the current design methodology and struggles for a “sensory
intensification” in architectural design (Van Kreij, 2008). On
the contrary, most practicing architects typically rely on visual
representations both during the design process (e.g., sketches
and technical drawings) and the subsequent phase of project
communication to the public or the client (e.g., 3D models
and renders). Moreover, architects rely almost solely on pictures
and drawings (in architectural magazines or books) to establish
their personal aesthetics and design method (Wastiels et al.,
2013).
NON-VISUAL PERCEPTION AND
SUPRAMODALITY IN THE HUMAN
BRAIN
Visual information plays a crucial role in shaping the manner
in which we represent and interact with the world around us.
In fact, for sighted people, vision is so pervasive that they find
it hard to imagine a world that does not reach them through
their eyes. Thanks to the omnipresence of such kind of perceptual
information, sighted people tend to think of themselves as ‘visual
beings.’ Through preferred metaphors, languages often suggest
the dominance of vision over other modalities to construct
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conceptual knowledge. In English, for example, knowing and
seeing are often used interchangeably in daily conversation, with
expressions such as ‘I see what you mean,’ ‘can you see my point?’
or ‘seeing is believing.’ In ancient Greek, the verb root ‘to know’
was used as the past tense of the verb root ‘to see,’ which lacked
its own past tense, so that “I saw” was the equivalent of “I
knew.”
Consequently, the great majority of psychophysical and
neuroscientific studies have been historically focused on the
characterization of visual perception and on the dissection
of the different steps of visual information processing (e.g.,
Firestein, 2012) and only recently has non-visual perception
started to attract some attention (e.g., Klatzky and Lederman,
2011; Ricciardi and Pietrini, 2011; Ricciardi et al., 2014a; Lacey
and Sathian, 2015).
In particular, although vision offers distinctive and unique
pieces of information (e.g., colors, perspective, shadows, etc.),
several observations indicate that vision might not be so
necessary to form a proficient mental representation of
the world around us. Indeed, individuals who are visually
deprived since birth show perceptual, cognitive, and social
skills comparable to those found in sighted individuals
(Ricciardi et al., 2006, 2009, 2014a,b; Cattaneo et al., 2008;
Pietrini et al., 2009; Ricciardi and Pietrini, 2011; Handjaras
et al., 2012, 2016; Heimler et al., 2015). Chris Downey
is an architect, Esref Armagan is a painter, Peter Eckert
is a photographer: all of them are blind people and yet
perfectly capable of successfully conducting their professional
lives.
In recent years, functional brain imaging allowed
neuroscientists to look at the brains of visually deprived
individuals in vivo to explore the effects of lack of vision on
the formation of proper mental representations. Notably, the
question of the extent to which vision is really necessary for the
human brain to function, and thus to represent the surrounding
world, has recently extended its reach toward a few architectural
theorists (Robinson and Pallasmaa, 2015).
Most neuroscientific studies conducted on blind individuals
have primarily focused on the structural and functional
compensatory plastic rearrangements occurring as a consequence
of sensory loss. In sight-deprived individuals, the ‘unisensory’
visual occipital cortex structurally rewires to accommodate
non-visual sensory inputs (e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2015), while
showing functional cross-modal responses to several non-visual
perceptual and cognitive tasks (e.g., Amedi et al., 2005; Frasnelli
et al., 2011; Heimler et al., 2014). The loss of a specific sensory
modality, such as vision, represents a unique opportunity to
understand the real extent to which the brain morphological and
functional architecture is programmed to develop independently
of any visual experience. Neuroimaging protocols have been
suggesting that distinct perceptual tasks evoke comparable
patterns of brain responses between congenitally blind and
sighted individuals: for instance, both groups show overlapping
responses in the ventral temporo-occipital cortex when visually
or non-visually recognizing object forms, in the middle temporal
area when discriminating motion across sensory modalities
and in the dorsal occipito-parietal region when processing
spatial information and spatial representations (Amedi et al.,
2001, 2002; Pietrini et al., 2004; Ricciardi et al., 2007; Bonino
et al., 2008, 2015; for a review: Cattaneo and Vecchi, 2008;
Cattaneo et al., 2008; Ricciardi and Pietrini, 2011; Handjaras
et al., 2012, 2016; Heimler et al., 2014; Ricciardi et al.,
2014a,b).
The sharing of an active ‘visual’ area both in sighted and blind
participants across visual and tactile task modalities implies a
more abstract, supramodal representation of specific information
content. Supramodal brain regions may share a representation
of the perceived stimuli independent of the input format from
the sensory modality conveying the information to the brain
(Figure 2).
As vision has long been considered crucial to explore and
represent external sensory stimuli (that are processed along a
segregated, but hierarchically organized, network of brain areas),
supramodal responses were first assessed within the well-known
visual functional pathways (e.g., Milner and Goodale, 1995;
Goodale and Milner, 2006; Handjaras et al., 2012).
Supramodality has more recently been shown to be involved
in integrated semantic representations and affective processing,
ranging from action understanding to emotional and social
functioning (Ricciardi et al., 2013, 2014a,b; Handjaras et al., 2015;
Handjaras et al., 2016; Leo et al., 2016). Consequently, a more
general ‘supramodal mechanism’ advances from simpler low-
level to more complex sensory information toward more abstract,
‘conceptual’ representations.
FIGURE 2 | Supramodal areas showing functional responses to
different perceptual, cognitive, and affective stimuli (as shown through
different colors), independently from the sensory modality that
conveys the information to the brain [modified from Ricciardi et al.
(2014a)].
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WHEN NEUROSCIENCE ‘TOUCHES’
ARCHITECTURE: DO WE REALLY NEED
VISION?
Therefore, according to this perspective, distinct elements of
form and space in architectural perception may be processed
and represented in highly specialized brain regions in a sensory
modality-independent manner. In this sense, assessing the
consistency or roughness of a material may recruit a supramodal
neural content independently of the sense involved. The same
may happen when exploring a complex object only by actively
touching it. Rasmussen (1964) provided many examples which
could be construed as supramodal architectural experiences ante
litteram: he claimed, for instance, that just looking at the surface
of a wall could evoke sensations of weightiness or lightness,
hardness or softness.
On these premises, Mallgrave (2011) approached the
supramodal hypothesis as a possible neural explanation of
hapticity. As a matter of fact, by supporting the view of a more
abstract nature of information representation, supramodality
could theoretically comprehend and thus represent the neural
correlate of hapticity and consequently provide the theoretical
basis for its empirical investigation.
Nonetheless, if it is evident that vision is not solely responsible
for spatial appraisal and perception as hapticity would imply,
the notion of supramodality, in line with the intuition of a
‘sensory intensification’ in architectural appraisal (Van Kreij,
2008), further implies a more comprehensive overview on the
embodiment of architectural experiences, shifting the balance
beyond immediate sensory perception – not limited to a single
sensory modality – toward higher cognitive, more abstract
representations involving semantic, emotional and even social
processing.
The conceptual potential of hapticity may have not been
fully characterized yet, and therefore not fully exploited by
architects. In addition, stating the predominance of the tactile
sensory modality may be wrong. In fact, touch is constrained
both spatially and temporally, as compared to vision. By
definition, haptic perception happens in sequence, within a
limited perceptual range and only through direct contact with the
perceived object (Pons et al., 1987). In addition, the sense of touch
relies more on specific properties, such as surface texture, than
global ones, such as shape or localization in space (e.g., Lakatos
and Marks, 1999; Podrebarac et al., 2014). On the other hand,
vision relies on a parallel sensory processing, able to provide a
comprehensive, ‘gestaltic’ perception over a distance and on a
wider spatial extent (e.g., Gibson, 1979). Furthermore, functional
neuroanatomy and psychophysiology demonstrated a perceptual
and cognitive dominance of vision over other sensory modalities
(Sereno et al., 1995; Gross, 1998).
Nonetheless, neuroscientists have recently referred to touch in
a way that may take hapticity into account. From a phylogenetic
perspective touch is an ‘earlier’ sense, developing prior to vision
(even bacteria have it). Touch is a key element in communicating
emotions and intimacy, maintaining and reinforcing social bonds
(Suvilehto et al., 2015) and evidence shows that tactile stimulation
accelerates brain development in infants (Guzzetta et al., 2009).
Touch could even entail emotional involvement with inanimate
objects (e.g., Hornik, 1992) and, from a functional perspective,
it has been proven that the somatosensory cortices and the
action recognition network show vicarious activations during
non-visual socially relevant interactions (for a review: Keysers
et al., 2010). Most importantly, haptic perception is crucial in
determining a ‘sense of presence,’ which refers to the perception
“of being immersed in the surrounding environment,” whereas
vision often does not (Bracewell et al., 2008; Slater et al.,
2009). As neuroscientists and architectural designers, we may
ask ourselves whether environment appraisal indeed relies on
such sensation of ‘being there’ (or ‘in touch,’ as it were) as
the notion of hapticity seems to indicate, and to what extent
it does so. Because the theorists of hapticity supported their
idea of a multimodal sensing in the architectural experience by
relying on the neuroscientific evidence that visual and non-visual
information is equally processed and represented in the human
brain, design decisions can truly integrate such knowledge to
enhance architectural experience embracing the whole of the
different sensory modalities. For instance, a recent study showed
that symmetry is represented in the lateral occipital cortex in a
supramodal fashion (Bauer et al., 2015) and many other design-




Since we spend the most part of our lives in buildings,
our environment would greatly benefit from a perspective on
architectural and urban design that is shared by both the architect
and the neuroscientist. However, we must bear in mind that when
dealing with the scientific method that characterizes life sciences,
as suggested by Mallgrave (2015), architects must be prepared to
address unexpected and possibly unwelcome empirical realities.
In fact, while the ‘neuro-turn’ has been welcomed by some
architects as a way to “humanize” buildings (Pallasmaa, 2012)
or to enhance architectural experience (Mallgrave, 2011), in
other fields the same shift provoked an opposite reaction: some
historians and sociologists see the fascination for neurosciences
as a menace to human diversity and creativity (Fitzgerald and
Callard, 2014), as a deeper knowledge of the molecular and
neural correlates of human mind and behavior would prompt
stereotyped approaches to design.
Many socially relevant research questions could be explored
by neuroscience and architecture in synergy (see for instance:
Pasqualini et al., 2013; Vartanian et al., 2013, 2015; Choo
et al., 2016). Whereas currently the outcomes of this dialog
and contamination between architecture and neuroscience are
hardly predictable, we believe in the paramount importance of
sharing knowledge among disciplines. Actually, the dialectics
between the notions of hapticity and supramodality that we have
described in this essay is a clear example of the weaknesses and
potential strength of sharing theoretical models and terms. So,
although hapticity suggests a primacy of touch that evidence from
neuroscience does
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not fully support, it also highlights the urge for a deeper
understanding of processing or integration of multiple sensory
modalities in environmental perception and appraisal. Actually,
the comparison between these two different, but complementary
approaches, may lead to novel observations regarding
the people–environment relationships (e.g., concerning the
architectural elements that may evoke the ‘sense of presence’),
and even provide empirical foundations for a renewed evidence-
based design theory (e.g., characterizing which visual and haptic
cues evoke similar percepts or dissecting the role of each sensory
modality in processing spatial information).
Such ambiguity of terms demands clarity. Many scientific
fields that have matured toward the establishment of accepted
methods had to come to terms with theoretical uncertainties
such as those faced by architectural theorists and researchers
right now. In scientific investigation, more accurate conceptual
and linguistic choices should be made, in order to provide
a common ground for the involved disciplines: specific terms
must be preferred to fashionable and evocative ones, and
evidence-based demonstrations should overcome speculations
[Lilienfeld et al., 2015; see Franz (2005) as an example of such
approach].
No infatuation for neuroscience will bring beneficial change to
the architectural field if even eminent theorists still rely on verbal
descriptions and speculations. On the contrary, if a paradigm
shift awaits architecture, it cannot rely on a turn to neuroscience
alone: architectural researchers now need to embody the ethos of
empirical responsibility.
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